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Foreword 
This report concerns the curricular internship from the Master’s Degree in Veterinary Medicine, 
subordinated to the Public Health field. The internship took place between 22nd February and 
24th June 2016 at the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) headquarters, in Paris, 
France. 
During this training period, I was under the supervision of Tianna Brand, who is the Chargée de 
Mission for Biological Threat Reduction. I integrated the Scientific and Technical Department 
and I was assigned some projects besides writing the present report. 
During the first month, I updated the technical disease cards available at OIE website. I made 
changes and updates based on OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, OIE Manual for Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines and also on relevant scientific publications, such as those from the Iowa 
State University’s Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH). 
Besides, I built a database for organising information regarding Laboratory Twinning projects. 
This assignment allowed me to exponentially develop my Microsoft Access skills, since the data 
output concerning project reports delivery dates is complex. 
From the beginning of April onwards, I started to create another database, this one for cross 
referencing potential biological threat agents between the CFSPH publications, Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and OIE listed diseases. 
The latter assignment sparked my interest for the biological threat reduction field, so I decided 
to further develop the subject and embrace it as my report’s theme. 
I also had the opportunity of writing an article for OIE Bulletin. I wrote about the IVSA Animal 
Welfare Conference, which I attended from the 22nd to the 24th April in Utrecht, The 
Netherlands. 
Afterwards, I was assigned to update the information available on “Rinderpest – Post-
eradication” website, which allowed me to deepen my notions on international cooperation and 
policy making. Also regarding biological threat reduction, I was asked to help in the preparation 
of the 2017 OIE Biological Threat Reduction Conference. My tasks were to investigate was had 
been done regarding previous conference recommendations (2015) and to explore what 
activities, partnerships, and publications relevant organizations had been developing in 
meantime. I also created an internal newsletter – “Biothreat watch”, which is going to be sent 
periodically to the Scientific and Technical Department colleagues. 
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Furthermore, from the 21st to the 27th of May, I attended OIE 84rd General Session, in Paris. 
This was a great chance to be at the centre of all decisions concerning animal health in the 
world, to have contact with the 180 delegates and their commissions, and my colleagues at 
OIE. 
My next project was the creation of a web portal about peste des petits ruminants (PPR) and 
the Global Strategy for its control and eradication. I also updated Rinderpest’s web portal, which 
now focuses on post-eradication activities. I took that opportunity to update the PPR and 
rinderpest Disease Information Summaries. Finally, I restructured the Biothreat Reduction 
portal, including the strategy document, factsheet and PowerPoint presentations available there. 
My last assignment was a cooperative project with Tongan farmers, for whom I provided 
information on how to assemble a duck raising farm. 
In the final analysis, this internship has exceeded every expectation I might have had, even 
though they were quite high. I had the chance to collaborate with almost every department, to 
attend many meetings and had hoc group reunions and to be a part of several OIE events.  
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Summary 
 
The use of biologic agents as means of causing distress is as ancient as human conflict. 
However, biologic agents can pose a threat even without a mischievous perpetrator planning 
their release. The evolution of scientific and technological resources allows for the creation of 
new agents, new pathways of introduction and new threats to arise. These emerging threats, in 
combination with climate change and growth in international trade and human migration pose 
increasing challenges upon surveillance systems and response mechanisms. 
This report comprises a review of possible ways of introduction of biological threats, agents of 
concern and the role International Organizations play on the prevention of natural and 
deliberate outbreaks, as well as their response mechanisms and cooperation agreements. It 
has been made a reflexion on the likeliness of the occurrence of a deliberate biological attack 
comparing it to the occurrence of accidental or natural episodes and how to differentiate both. 
The purpose of this report is to make a revision of the current situation regarding biological 
agents which have potential to pose a significant threat to humans, animals and the 
environment, both on health and economic perspectives. 
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Sumário 
 
O recurso a agentes biológicos como meio de causar vicissitudes é tão antigo como o conflito 
humano. De todo o modo, estes podem representar uma ameaça, mesmo sem um 
prevaricador que planeie a sua introdução no meio. A evolução dos recursos científicos e 
técnicos permitiu a criação de novos agentes, novas vias de introdução e novas ameaças. 
Estas ameaças emergentes, em combinação com as alterações climáticas e o crescimento do 
comércio global e dos movimentos migratórios humanos, representam um desafio crescente 
para os sistemas de vigilância e mecanismos de resposta. 
 
Este relatório inclui uma revisão das possíveis vias de introdução de ameaças biológicas, dos 
agentes de interesse e do papel que as Organizações Internacionais desempenham na 
prevenção de surtos quer naturais, quer intencionais, assim como os seus acordos de 
cooperação. Além disso, foi feita uma reflexão acerca da probabilidade e impacto da ocorrência 
de um ataque biológico, em relação à ocorrência de episódios acidentais ou naturais e de como 
os distinguir.  
 
O objetivo deste relatório é a realização de uma revisão dos potenciais agentes de ameaça 
biológica e as suas vias de introdução, ou fatores que predispõem a sua ocorrência, com 
especial enfoque nos agentes que possam causar especial prejuízo à saúde humana, animal e 
ambiental, para além de trazer consequências económicas significativas.  
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“What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it. This is 
all the more worrisome when we engage in deadly conflicts: wars are fundamentally unpredictable (and 
we do not know it). Owing to this misunderstanding of the causal chains between policy and actions, we 
can easily trigger Black Swans thanks to aggressive ignorance-like a child playing with a chemistry kit.”
   
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable 
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1. Biological Warfare 
 
Historical context 
The use of disease agents as military weaponries is as old as human conflict. There are records 
of poisons being used as a means to neutralize enemy troops from as early as the VI century 
BC. In antiquity, disease affected animal and human cadavers were thrown over opponents’ 
walls as a way of spreading disease – the catapulting of bubonic plague (Yersinia pestis) 
victims onto the besieged city of Kaffa, in 1346, and the subsequent flee of Genovese 
merchants, changed the course of history, as it represented the spread to the Mediterranean 
basin of the world pandemics, which ended up killing around 50% of European and Asian 
populations.[18, 56] There are many more historical examples which have had milder 
consequences than the previous one – wine contaminated with leprosy patients’ secretions, 
saliva from rabid dogs shoot over enemy troops, plague infected clothing, etc. Napoleon even 
built a swamp around the Italian city of Mantua, hoping to favour the spread of malaria among 
the British army. Perhaps, the most well-known episode is the delivery of smallpox drenched 
clothing to the Native Americans by English and French colonial armies. [56]  
In the past century, the 1st World War (WWI) saw the rising of the first livestock-oriented 
biological threats – the German anti-livestock programme deserves special mention, as it was 
the first of its kind organised at a national level, with scientific foundations and one of the couple 
that happened during war period. The other programme belonged to Japan and killed hundreds 
of people in the attempt of developing bioweapons and understanding the effects of pathogens 
on human origin systems.[60] 
The WWI culminated with the signature of Geneva Protocol by the League of Nations, in 1925. 
This document prohibits the use of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices’ and ‘bacteriological methods of warfare’. This is now 
understood as a general prohibition on chemical and biological weapons, but does not impose 
limits on production, storage or transfer of these instruments.[30] However, this agreement was 
not respected by nations such as United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan and Soviet 
Union.[18] 
Both the 2nd World War (WWII) and the Cold War brought innovation in bioweapon investigation 
field. Not only animal diseases were more deeply studied than ever before, but also vaccines 
(such as rinderpest’s) were developed. Besides, new disease transmission vehicles were 
created.[60] 
In 1972, resulting from efforts of the international community to create a treaty that would 
supplement the Geneva Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was 
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created and signed by more than 100 countries at the time. It commits the parties to prohibit the 
development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. However, the absence of any formal 
verification regime to monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention, as it 
is essentially based on trust.[31] Nevertheless, prior to the Gulf War, it was documented the use 
of chemical weapons in Iraq. Also, in 1992, Russia admitted that the former Soviet Union, 
despite being a co-depository of the BTWC, had continued a massive offensive biological 
weapons programme for years.[60] 
Therefore, in 1985, an informal group of countries, known as the Australia Group, gathered 
efforts to help member countries identify the exported commodities which need to be controlled 
so as not to contribute to the spread of chemical and biological agents. The scope of the export 
controls discussed by the Group in its annual meetings has evolved to address emerging 
threats and challenges.[20] 
Definitions 
‘Biological warfare’ (biowarfare) and ‘bioterrorism’ are defined as ‘the intentional use of 
microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms as an act of war or political violence with 
the intent to cause death or disease in humans, animals or plants’.[12] 80% of pathogens that 
could potentially be used for bioterrorism are of animal origin.[37]  Biowarfare programs seek to 
inflict sufficient severe disease to paralyse a city and perhaps a nation. They happen at large 
scale, as between governments or from populations against its government. To be effective, 
bioterrorism does not need to achieve the level of impact sought by biowarfare programs – it 
impacts humans through fear, as well as through disease and death, thereby exploiting 
pathogens as weapons for mass destruction; the initiative departs from individuals, cults or 
extremist groups. The greatest difference is that bioterrorism can have a major impact with only 
a few cases of disease.[17] 
‘Biorisk’ refers to the risk associated with a particular biological event (in the present context: 
naturally occurring diseases, accidents, unexpected discovery, or deliberate misuse of 
biological agents and toxins), which may affect adversely the health of populations and the 
environment. 
Animal pathogens may be used as biological weapons, in biocrimes or in bioterror because they 
have a high impact, are cheap, easy to acquire and propagate, and can be readily smuggled 
through border checks undetected.[36] 
 
Synthetic agents 
Synthetic biology is an interdisciplinary area, comprising contributions from biologists, 
engineers, physicists, computer scientists, etc. It relies on the findings from the genetic 
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investigation field, concerning recombinant DNA and genome sequencing. The ultimate goal of 
synthetic biologists is not further from building a biological system from scratch.[21] The 
biotechnology revolution means that options for engineering animal pathogens are increasing all 
the time (and becoming more widely available), whilst the cost of doing so is decreasing. Most 
pathogens that have been used to develop bioweapons have been animal pathogens.[36] 
In the last decades, not only scientists were able to recreate extinct viruses, such as the 
Spanish flu virus, but also to increase the virulence of already existing viruses, although not 
always intentionally.[42] Perhaps, the most concerning point might be the availability of genetic 
information/material to the general public – as illustrated in 2002, when a team of virologists at 
the State University of New York synthesized the poliovirus using genetic information obtained 
off the internet.[42] 
Since the beginning of the XXI century, and especially after the ‘Anthrax letters’ episode[41] in 
the US, governments have expressed concern about the misuse of biotechnology. This anxiety 
finds its roots in the belief that globalization and the rapid development of biotechnology 
facilitate access to specialized knowledge, making it easier for terrorists to apply scientific 
advances to wicked purposes. On December 20th 2011, the press announced that the US 
government had requested Science and Nature to refrain from publishing a full account of an 
experiment that increased the transmissibility of bird flu virus H5N1, aiming to avoid the 
replication of the process by rogue actors.[42] 
However, from a non-sensationalist perspective, these concerns seem to underestimate the 
painstaking planning and bench-work that such scientific endeavours require. It took decades of 
failed attempts until the achievement of the above mentioned results. Scientific publications 
typically do not stipulate the difficulties, mistakes, and failures that scientists endure, nor do they 
clearly specify how problems have been solved. They only present the successful results in a 
sanitized way. The truth is that, in spite of technological progress, scientific work remains the 
result of the cumulative and cooperative work of teams of scientists whose skills derive from 
years of experimentation and testing. [42] Saying that biology is as much an art as a science, 
might not be an over-statement. However, this would be an art that requires a certain 
organizational environment to express itself fully.  
Current situation 
The domestic and international spread of infectious animal disease may occur through natural, 
accidental, or intentional means. 60% of human infectious diseases evolve from animal 
pathogens and 75% of emerging human infectious diseases have an animal disease origin. [37]  
Transnational spread of disease may result from movement of animals, animal products or 
cultures from infectious organisms.[8] Nowadays, a single case of a high profile disease (as 
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) or Peste des Petits 
Ruminants(PPR)), or a small number of cases of more common diseases (as Newcastle 
disease or Bovine Tuberculosis) may result in international sanctions that cause major 
economic losses for agriculture and related industries.[17] In a global panorama where countries 
seek to improve their external image as a means of favouring trade and international relations, 
such episodes can be devastating. Since 1998, the OIE has the mandate from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to officially recognise disease-free areas of countries for trade purposes. 
The procedure for the official recognition of disease status by the OIE is voluntary and applies 
currently to 5 diseases – BSE, PPR, FMD, Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia, African Horse 
Sickness and Classical Swine Fever (CSF). However, OIE member-countries have the 
possibility to self-declare their country or a region within their territory free from certain OIE-
listed diseases other than those for which the OIE has put in place a specific procedure for 
official recognition of freedom from disease- status. Self-declaration of a compartment, as is the 
case for a country or zone, is made under the full responsibility of the Member Country 
concerned. [39] 
Good examples of the above mentioned situation are the inadvertent introductions of FMD and 
CSF viruses in the UK in 2001. The resulting CSF epidemic caused great economic hardship, 
since pig farmers in the area were obliged to slaughter their pigs a preventive measure and the 
export of pig products from the UK was suspended. News reports in March 2001 indicated that 
at least one of the relict endemic sheep breeds of England (Herdwick sheep) was severely 
threatened through sanitary slaughter as a consequence of the FMD outbreak.[12] Modern high-
density industrial livestock facilities, centralised feed supply systems, and transportation 
methods increase the susceptibility of livestock populations to disease outbreaks, and the 
vulnerability of economies to disruption as a result of disease epidemic in livestock.[12] 
Regarding eradicated diseases – Rinderpest and Smallpox – and diseases that are already 
restricted to small parts of the globe, as well as to laboratory repositories, biosafety is especially 
important. The greatest threats to biodiversity and international trade may well come from 
accidental, or intentional, releases of virulent broad-spectrum disease agents, as the result of 
inadequate containment within production, transport or storage facilities, or inadvertent releases 
resulting from offensive strikes against production or storage facilities.[12] Transmission of 
biological agents through the air is likely to impact the greatest number of individuals, but 
transmission by other means, such as water, food, insect and arthropod vectors, etc.--may also 
be routes of exposure of individuals to biological agents.[46] Although the probability of a 
deliberate or accidental release may be relatively low, the impact may be catastrophic from a 
national to a global level.[36] 
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2. Natural and Intentional Spread of Disease 
Wildlife and Invasive Species 
Invasive species of animals or their accompanying microorganisms may pose a threat to 
environment and to the natural balance of ecosystems, whether their introduction is intentional 
or not. Invasive species are defined as ‘alien species (not native, introduced through human 
activity) that reach the final stage of the invasion process and have the capacity to spread’. [29] 
Alien species can thrive and scatter in their new environment, particularly in the absence of 
natural enemies. They can also prey upon or out-compete native species for food and for 
habitat. Moreover, alien species sometimes carry pathogens which threaten native species. The 
International Union for Conservation of Nature has reported that 51% of all known endangered 
species are threatened because of invasive ones.[47] 
It may come as an unusual perspective for some, but actually human species has invaded the 
largest surface area of the planet, occupying almost every land mass. We spread out from our 
native Africa, throughout all earth’s habitats and ecosystems – never doing it alone, but rather 
accompanied by parasites, commensals, food, ornamental crops and domesticated animals.[29] 
And, to this day, we keep on doing it, not only as a part of our careers and leisure activities, but 
also to escape conflict situations, such as the current one in the Middle-East, or natural 
disasters and extreme climate events.  
The introduction of species into new areas, if not accidental, may have purposes as different as 
acclimatisation (creating variety), pest control, recreational, etc. These movements have been 
done frequently without any structured intent or pre-established strategy, generating 
consequences as damaging as if the intentions of the perpetrator were mischievous.[29]  A good 
example is the introduction of myxomatosis virus in Australian (1937) and French (1952) rabbit 
populations, as an attempt of reducing their overgrowing populations. This initiative was a 
complete failure, as in Australia several attempts were needed to achieve a result, whereas in 
France a single introduction was sufficient to spread the virus throughout Europe. In the end, 
neither the host nor the virus died out in either of the countries.[29] From the beginning of the XXI 
century, the accidental introduction of Asian Vespa velutina in Europe is contributing to the loss 
of honeybees (Apis mellifera) colonies and decrease in pollinators. This biological invasion has 
led to several serious problems because V.velutina preys on the domestic honeybees, disrupts 
the ecological role of the honeybees, potentially alters biodiversity, harms commercial 
beekeeping activities and is potentially deadly to people who are allergic. This species was 
identified for the first time in France in 2004. Currently it has spread across Spain, Portugal, 
Belgium, and Italy.[27] 
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More recently, in May 2016, Australian authorities announced that, after conducting extensive 
research on the possible impacts of such measures, they are going to release Cyprinid 
Herpesvirus-3 over the European Carp population that has invaded the Murray-Darling basin 
area. These fish account for more than 90% of the local biomass and are nearly useless as a 
fishing product.[10] 
 
The risk of dispersing invasive species through acts of bioterrorism, especially human 
pathogens, cannot be neglected. However, that risk appears quite low in comparison to the risk 
of intentionally releasing animal pathogens that could disrupt the livestock producing industries 
of countries which rely on them economically.[29]  
Although it is not directly related to bioterrorism, the intentional release of unwanted exotic 
companion animals (such as Burmese python and prairie dogs) also has a major environmental 
and economic impact and, possibly, animal and human health impact, in case of accidental 
release of zoonotic agents. Taking prairie dogs as an example – tularaemia and plague are two 
zoonotic diseases that have occurred in animals intended for companion animal trade. Keeping 
prairie dogs as pets in the US is no longer possible, after a monkeypox outbreak in 2003.[7] 
Emerging infectious diseases 
According to current literature, the frequency with which new pathogens emerge is increasing, 
even if the increased global surveillance is taken into account. Also, the global distribution of all 
the major groups of emerging diseases strongly correlates with human population density, 
supporting the theory that disease emergence is driven by largely anthropogenic changes – 
namely the expansion of agriculture, travel routes, trade, and land use.[28] Zoonotic disease risks 
are predicted to further increase as environmental changes continue and population continues 
to grow exponentially.[55] Despite their substantial repercussion on global public health and our 
growing understanding of the process by which they emerge, no pandemic has so far been 
predicted before infecting human beings. However, patterns in the origin and spread of new 
pathogens can be noted and are an intrinsic, although necessarily tailored, as part of a 
surveillance strategy.[28] 
 
Emerging infectious diseases, including those which are evolving to evade currently available 
control options (vaccines and antimicrobials), pose an increasing risk to health. The 
mechanisms for disease emergence are complex and often incompletely understood, but it is 
likely that the trend for new diseases to emerge will only continue as global movements of 
people and animals increases and as human behaviours change the environment around us.[36] 
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Emergence in new regions is caused primarily by pathogen movement, due to trade and travel, 
whereas local emergence is driven by a combination of environmental changes, that affect 
vectors and wildlife hosts, and social changes (e.g., poverty and conflict), that affect human 
exposure to vectors.[25] 
Endemic animal diseases are a daily burden for health and agriculture in some of the world’s 
poorest countries, obstructing economic and social development and limiting food availability.[36] 
Increasing demand for food due to an expanding global population has led to a substantial 
susceptibility of our populations to food-borne zoonosis. Pathogens in the livestock production 
chain are a particular risk, with repeated outbreaks from meat, eggs, milk, and cheese, or meat 
by-products incorporated into foods as flavouring, oils, or stock. Globally, most types of 
domesticated and wild vertebrates and many invertebrates are food for people – thus capable of 
harbouring zoonotic bacteria, viruses, or parasites.[24] 
The same diseases, whether they are or 
not foodborne, when introduced to 
developed countries, which may have 
already eliminated them, spread rapidly 
through naïve animal populations and 
represent severe consequences for 
livestock production, for business, and for 
the availability/y and price of food on 
domestic and international markets.[36] 
Transmission rates are usually higher in dense than in sparse populations, due to higher 
frequency of contacts and feebler immune systems, and  spread is often greatly enhanced by 
air travel or human migration.[28] The ease associated with air travel, enabling global transit in a 
single day (Figure 1), has accelerated introductions since it has allowed many pathogens that 
cause acute infections to reach other continents within the few days that hosts are infectious 
(e.g., Chikungunya and West Nile viruses), and even during the latent period for some 
diseases. Several of these pathogens were also favoured by the climate changes of the XX 
century, which resulted in the introduction of another key vector - Aedes spp. in areas 
previously free from its presence.[45]  This mosquito  can carry many viral pathogens, including 
the Yellow  Fever virus, Zika virus, Dengue and Chikungunya, as well as several filarial 
nematodes. Thus, the most recent wave of pathogen introductions, and those likely to occur in 
the near future, are strikingly abrupt when is taken in consideration the smooth establishment of 
vectors in the last centuries.[25]  
Figure 1 – Global aviation network. In Kilpatrick et al, 2012 
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Steps in the emergence of pandemic zoonosis  
Among the several described processes for the 
emergence of zoonotic diseases, Daszak’s model 
(Figure 2) is the most adequate for the purposes of 
this report, as it focus on the dynamics of infection, 
rather than pathogen proprieties. It comprises three 
stages: 
- The first stage - disease emergence, takes place 
within the reservoir host species. Ecological, 
social, or socioeconomic changes alter the 
dynamics of pathogen transmission within the host 
or between hosts and allow the pathogen to 
expand within its host population, spread to a new 
region, or to be transmitted to another non-human 
host population or species. Each of these 
changes increases the likelihood of the pathogen 
making contact with and spilling over into human 
beings (and thus progressing to stage 2).The 
drivers that cause stage 1 emergence tend to be large-scale environmental, agricultural, or 
demographic shifts.  
- The second stage - localised emergence, represents the initial spill-over of a wildlife or 
livestock pathogen to people. Causes vary widely, from handling of carcasses, to exposure 
to fomites in markets, or in the wild.  
- The final stage - full pandemic emergence, is rarely achieved. It represents sustained 
person-to-person transmission and large scale spread.  
Alternatively, some pathogens can spread among human beings without evolutionary change 
from the genotypes present in the wildlife host (e.g., Ebola virus) and thus can enter human 
population at stage 2. The ultimate goal of successful pandemic prevention is to move the 
control point to the first stage.  
Spill over infections, just below the threshold for self-sustainment in people (R0<1), have been 
suggested as prime epidemics in waiting. Also, pathogens can transfer from human beings to 
animals and between animal species before being transferred back to people, allowing remixing 
and evolution with spillback and potentially enhanced pathogenicity.[28] Understanding the 
complex population biology and transmission ecology of multi-host parasites has been declared 
as one of the highest priorities for biomedical sciences during the XXI century.[55] 
Figure 2 – Emergence of zoonotic disease. 
In Morse et al, 2012 
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Deliberate usage 
To use biological agents as weapons is not as easy as it might seem. Besides the presence of 
the agent, it is required a delivery system, either to convey the agent, or to facilitate its 
dispersion.  
However, almost any disease-causing organism (such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, prions or 
rickettsiae) or toxins (natural or synthetically produced) can be used in biological weapons. The 
agents can be enhanced from their natural state, to make them more suitable for mass 
production, storage, and dissemination as weapons.[32] Regarding delivery mechanisms, there is 
a variety of methods. Past programmes have constructed missiles, bombs, hand grenades and 
rockets to deliver biological weapons. A number of programmes also designed spray-tanks to 
be fitted to aircraft, cars, trucks, and boats.  
On a less sophisticated side, and on a smaller- scale, delivery mechanisms can be as simple as 
a pen or a stick contaminated with the agent and brushed on susceptible animals. There have 
also been documented efforts to develop delivery devices for assassinations or sabotage 
operations, including a variety of sprays, brushes, and injection systems as well as means for 
contaminating food and clothing.[32] 
Accidental releases 
Working with highly virulent or highly pathogenic strains of virus or bacteria is a double edged 
sword. On the one hand, the development of vaccines and antimicrobials is essential for human 
and animal health, and the preparedness for the emergence of pandemic strains can spare 
many lives. But on the other hand, the risk of laboratory escape of these high-consequence 
pathogens far outweighs any potential advance. Accidental laboratory releases are a recurrent 
scenario. 
The risk of a manmade pandemic sparked by a laboratory escape is not hypothetical: one 
occurred in 1977 in China, with H1N1 Influenza. It occurred because of concerns that a natural 
pandemic might be imminent, due to reports of large outbreak of swine Influenza in the US .[19] 
From 1938 to 1972, the Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis vaccine caused most of the very 
outbreaks that it was called upon to prevent, due to poor inactivation of vaccine strains - a clear 
self-fulfilling prophecy.[19] 
The first fully acknowledged laboratory escape occurred in 1972, with the infection of a 
laboratory assistant at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, who was working 
with live smallpox virus. The assistant got sick and infected healthcare workers, other patients, 
and their visitors.[19]  
The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak spread to 29 countries. Since 
21% of all cases involved hospital workers, it had the potential to shutdown health care services 
wherever it struck. This pathogen is particularly dangerous to handle in the laboratory because 
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there is no vaccine, and it can be easily transmitted via aerosols. SARS has not re-emerged 
naturally, but there have been six escapes from virology labs: one in Singapore (August 2003) 
and one in Taiwan (December 2003), and four different escapes at the same laboratory in 
Beijing (2004).[19] 
Regarding FMD, the disease reappeared in Britain in 2007, 4 kilometres away from a biosafety 
level 4 laboratory (see chapter 4). The identified strain was the same that had caused an 
outbreak in 1967 in the United Kingdom, but was not then circulating in animals anymore. It 
was, however, used in vaccine manufacture at the nearby Pirbright facility. Investigations 
concluded that construction vehicles had carried mud contaminated with FMD from a defective 
wastewater line at Pirbright to the first farm. The resulting major outbreak disrupted UK 
agricultural production and exports, and cost an estimated 200 million pounds.[19] 
In 2010, WHO released a guidance document named Responsible life sciences research for 
global health security with the purpose of informing Member States about the risks posed by 
accidents or the deliberate misuse of life sciences research and to propose measures to 
minimize them within the context of 
promoting and harnessing the power of 
the life sciences to improve health for all 
people. This guide also focuses on one 
measure of biorisk reduction, namely the 
biorisk management framework for 
responsible life sciences research (Figure 
3).  The framework emphases a vision of 
promoting excellent, high-quality, 
responsible, safe and secure research, 
where the results of the research 
promote advancements in health, 
economic development, global health 
security, evidence-informed policy-
making and public trust in science.[58] 
How to differentiate? 
It is possible to differentiate between deliberate and natural occurrences of disease through 
current genome sequencing technologies. The field of studies designated to such investigations 
is called microbial forensics – its ultimate goal is to identify and criminally prosecute the 
responsible parties for a deliberate outbreak of disease.  It is an important part of a 
strengthened capability to respond to biocrime and bioterrorism, and works in parallel with an 
epidemiological investigation. The latter aims to find the source of the outbreak and to clarify its 
Figure 3 – Biorisk management framework for responsible 
life sciences research. Source: WHO: Responsible life 
sciences research for global health security; 2010. 
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routes of transmission, in order to hinder its further spread, and reduce the risk of future 
outbreaks, through effective preventive measures.   The epidemiologic investigation might begin 
before or after the microbial forensics intervention, depending on the nature of the outbreak – in 
deliberate overt outbreaks, when the perpetrator informs authorities of his intentions, both 
investigations take place at the same time.[50] 
 
Gene sequencing technologies allow the differentiation between closely related isolates. While 
in human DNA the chances of finding two samples with coincidental profiles are minimal, the 
same does not happen with asexually reproducing organisms. Regarding bacterial populations, 
the genetic variation inducing mechanisms make it possible for a cell to differ from its ancestor 
and can also cause unrelated organisms to contain shared sequences.[50] Therefore, when 
comparing individual strains of a microbial species, a complete or near-complete match 
between individual strains does not necessarily reflect identity. Similarly, minor genetic 
differences between strains do not necessarily exclude the possibility that they might originate 
from the same source. However, the assumption when using genome-sequencing systems is 
that individual isolates that share marker profiles are related. Most bacterial genetic 
comparisons that have been reported to date rely on genetic marker systems, in which each 
marker reflects a specific part of the microbial genome.[50] Collections of reference strains have 
been created and can be used to compare new isolates, in order to analyse population 
structures and the relationships between the species’ individual strains. 
Sequencing and analysis of the entire genome of an organism can reveal subtle genetic 
differences that would not be detected by older methodologies. Until recently, the process of 
whole-genome sequencing and analysis was meticulous, expensive, and time-consuming. 
However, the recent development of the so called “next-generation sequencing technologies” 
has revolutionized biology by greatly reducing the time and expenses required. The 
development of whole-genome sequence databases will be extremely valuable in successfully 
tracing pathogens in the future.[50] 
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Microbial forensic investigations have been described as consisting of three interrelated stages 
described in detail on Figure 4: 
 identification of the biological agent(s) responsible for the event;  
 characterization of the event as either intentional or unintentional;  
 if the event is deemed illegitimate, attribution of use to a specific perpetrator.  
Many of the questions asked during the first two stages of a microbial forensics investigation are 
identical to those examined in an epidemiologic investigation, and the same methods and 
technologies are generally used to answer them. However, the third stage is unique to microbial 
forensics. At this stage, in addition to the usual forensic analyses of recovered materials from 
the crime scene, detailed analyses are conducted of the attack strain. Epidemiologic and 
microbial forensic investigations are generally conducted in parallel, and over time they may 
converge and diverge. The course of the investigation, will be influenced by whether the attack 
is overt or covert and especially by whether investigators are in possession of the utilized strain. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Characterization of a suspect occurrence investigation stages. Source: Sjodin A et al: The need for 
high-quality whole-genome sequence databases in microbial forensics. Biosecur Bioterror 2013  
[50]
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3. Biological Resources  
Concerning agents and diseases 
Different health-related organizations have distinct lists of pathogens of concern regarding 
biological threat agents. While there is an extensive list of pathogens identified as agents of 
interest, there are a few which are considered to have a higher risk of being used as biological 
or agricultural weapons. The criteria 
for such classification[8] are:  
 highly pathogenic or highly 
infective;  
 broad dispersion or availability;  
 low levels of immunity to the 
agent in the target population;  
 overall negative effects of their 
release, regarding biologic and 
economic sectors;  
 not posing a threat to the 
perpetrator; 
 predictable clinical course; 
 passible of being attributed to a 
natural outbreak.[60] 
The agents of interest change, 
according to our focus on human or 
animal threat potential (Figure 5). Domestic animal pathogens are primarily considered from the 
perspective of economic trade impacts and/or ease of transmissibility. Whereas human 
pathogens are considered mainly from the perspective of potential mortality rates and/or public 
fear of the disease.[17] 
Agents/diseases overview 
According to the list of critical biological agents for public health preparedness created by the 
American Centres for Disease Control (CDC), on the next section follows an overview of the 
most relevant ones, concerning the purposes of this report. CDC’s list classifies agents in three 
categories (A, B, C) according to: 
 their ease of transmission; 
 associated morbidity and mortality; 
 likelihood of use. 
Figure 5 – Examples of linkages between important diseases of 
wildlife, domestic animals and humans. Source: Friend M; 
Biowarfare, Bioterrorism, and Animal Diseases as Bioweapons. In: 
Disease Emergence and Resurgence: The Wildlife-Human 
Connection. Circular 1285 (2006) - Modified 
MERS-CoV 
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Anthrax (Category A) 
Anthrax is the disease caused Bacillus anthracis, a bacterial zoonotic agent, which can be 
transmitted through inhalation or ingestion.[14] Despite being endemic in some areas of the 
world, it usually causes a limited number of animal cases and, quite rarely, human cases. Its 
prevalence has decreased consistently in the last few years.[40] 
In the past, anthrax has been used as a biowarfare resource. Namely, during WWI when 
Germany targeted horses, reindeers, mules and cattle in the US, Spain, Norway, and France 
with unknown, although possibly successful, results.[60] Also, in 1978-80 in Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), anthrax was introduced by the Rhodesian security forces as an attempt to 
undermine the moral of those seeking freedom, through the destruction of cattle populations.[60] 
In 2001, an unknown perpetrator sent “anthrax letters” to strategic targets in the US, killing five 
people and infecting 17 others.[41] More recently, in May 2016, Kenyan Intelligence Services 
foiled an attack by an ISIS group which intended to release Anthrax spores on civilians, through 
a “large-scale” attack.[22] 
Plague (Category A) 
Plague is caused by Yersinia pestis, which is a zoonotic, vector-transmitted bacteria, that can 
also be transmitted through inhalation.[14] The plague pandemic that swept through Eurasia and 
North Africa in the mid-XIV century was probably the greatest public health disaster in recorded 
history. Given the explosive nature and history of disease spread over wide areas, plague could 
be a dangerously effective biological weapon. In fact, during WWII, Japan successfully initiated 
a plague epidemic in China through the release of 15 million laboratory-infected fleas per attack 
from aircraft over Chinese cities[17]. Plague continues to be a life-threatening disease unless 
detected and treated early. Following the reappearance of the disease during the 1990s in 
several countries, plague was categorized as a re-emerging disease, and remains of great 
significance under the International Health Regulations (2005), as a plague outbreak may 
constitute a public health emergency of international concern.[2]  
Smallpox (Category A) 
Smallpox, also known as Variola, is caused a poxvirus and is exclusively a human disease.[14] It 
was the first disease to be declared eradicated, in 1980. This was achieved through focused 
surveillance and ring-vaccination. The guidance and support provided by Pan-American Health 
Organization and WHO were decisive. After its official certification as eradicated, an agreement 
was reached under which all remaining stocks of the virus would either be destroyed or passed 
to one of two secure laboratories – one in the US and another one in the Russian Federation.[59] 
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Tularemia (Category A) 
Tularemia is the disease caused by Francisella tularensis bacteria. It is a zoonotic, vector-borne 
disease, that can also be transmitted through direct contact, inhalation and contaminated food 
and water.[14] It is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or 
inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to initiate human infection. It occurs widely in nature and 
can be isolated and grown in quantity in a laboratory, although manufacturing an effective 
aerosol weapon would require considerable sophistication. However, person-to-person 
transmission is uncommon and the dispersion of F. tularensis as a weapon would be unlikely to 
generate secondary human cases or persist within targeted human population.[7] There are 
reports from the beginning of the XXI century which describe the release of tularemia-infected 
squirrels in order to initiate epizootics and  reduce small rodents populations.[17] 
Botulism (Category A) 
This disease is caused by Clostridium botulinum’s toxin and affects both humans and livestock. 
It can be present in contaminated food and water or be inhaled.[14] Botulism seems to be 
increasing in cattle, possibly due to the increase in use of plastic-packaged grass silage - these 
outbreaks can cause significant economic losses.[51] Human botulism is a serious but relatively 
rare paralytic disease. There are seven recognized types of the toxin that cause botulism, four 
of which (types A, B, E and rarely F) cause human botulism. Types C, D and E also cause 
illness in mammals, birds and fish.[2] Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin, especially A type, is one 
of the most lethal natural substances known.[34] 
Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers  
This name is a general term for severe illness, sometimes associated with bleeding, that may 
be caused by a number of viruses. These agents fall into different categories, according to CDC 
classification. The term is usually applied to disease caused by Arenaviridae (Lassa fever, Junin 
and Machupo), Bunyaviridae (Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF), Rift Valley Fever, 
Hantaan haemorrhagic fevers), Filoviridae (Ebola and Marburg) and Flaviviridae (yellow fever, 
dengue, Omsk haemorrhagic fever, Kyasanur forest disease)[59]. Some of these are zoonotic 
diseases, most of them vector-borne (mosquitos, ticks, rats and bats), which also can be 
transmitted through direct contact between infected humans. and affect non-human primates 
and guinea pigs.[14] Surprisingly, most of these diseases do not cause significant clinical signs 
on their animal hosts, but can be fatal to humans.[3] The following paragraphs will cover the 
most relevant ones for the purposes of this report. 
CCHF (Category C)  
CCHF is an expanding tick-borne disease with increasing human and animal health impact. It 
can cause severe outbreaks in humans, with high mortality rates, but is asymptomatic in cattle 
and ruminants, which act as amplifying hosts and reservoirs for human infection.[2] It is endemic 
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in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and Asia, in countries south of the 50 th parallel north.[59] 
Due to its high pathogenicity and the lack of approved vaccines, for either people or livestock, 
and specific intervention strategies, CCHF virus must be handled under biosafety level 4 
containment (see chapter 4). The recent emergence of CCHF, causing either sporadic human 
infections (Greece, 2008 and Uganda, 2013) or epidemics in previously unaffected areas 
(Turkey, 2003) has raised animal and public health concerns.[44]  
 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) (Category A) 
EVD has been present for a long time in African countries; it is a severe, often fatal illness in 
humans. EVD outbreaks have a case fatality rate of up to 90%.[2] However, over the span of a 
few weeks during July and August 2014, events in West Africa changed perceptions of Ebola 
virus disease from an exotic tropical disease to a priority for global health security. The 
epidemic was recognized as the largest in history, since more cases were reported than in all 
previous Ebola outbreaks combined. Recent investigations support the idea that bats were the 
source of the current epidemic in West Africa and enlarge the list of plausible reservoirs to 
include insectivorous bats, besides fruit bats, which may not be the ultimate source of past 
outbreaks.[26] 
 
Marburg virus disease (Category A) 
The virus was first identified in 1967, during epidemics in Marburg and Frankfurt, in Germany, 
and in Belgrade, in the former Yugoslavia, having originated from importation of infected 
monkeys from Uganda. It is a severe and highly fatal disease caused by a virus from the same 
family as the one that causes Ebola. These viruses are among the most virulent pathogens 
known to infect humans. Both diseases are rare, but have a capacity to cause dramatic 
outbreaks with high fatality.[59] 
Lassa fever (Category A)  
The disease typically occurs in humans in West Africa. It can be transmitted mainly through 
handling rats, food or house-hold items contaminated by rats’ urine and faeces. The virus can 
spread between people through direct contact with the body fluids of a person infected with 
Lassa fever, as well as contaminated bedding and clothing. Lassa fever has killed more than 
160 people in West Africa, most of them in Nigeria, since November 2015.[59]  
Food safety threats (Category B) 
Salmonellosis 
Outbreaks of salmonellosis have been reported for decades. In fact, it is one of the most 
common and wide distributed foodborne diseases. However, it is considered an emerging 
disease because its incidence has recently increased in many continents. [59] Since the 
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beginning of the 1990s, strains of salmonella that are resistant to a range of antimicrobials have 
emerged and threaten to become a serious public health problem.[59] Salmonella has been used 
in the past for terrorist purposes – in 1984, during an election in Oregon, USA, the Rajneesh 
cult introduced Salmonella in local salad bars, in order to keep voters away from the polls.[23] 
 
E. coli O157:H7 
This strain of E.coli (STEC) produces a highly hazardous substance called Shigatoxin. Around 
5–10% of those who are diagnosed with STEC infection develop a potentially life-threatening 
complication known as haemolytic uremic syndrome. STEC lives in the intestines of ruminants, 
including cattle, goats, sheep, deer and elk. STEC that cause human illness generally do not 
cause clinical disease in animals. Other kinds of animals, including pigs and birds, sometimes 
pick up STEC from the environment and may spread it. The transmission is faecal-oral, and 
people usually get sick through the consumption of faeces-contaminated foods, raw milk or by 
working in close proximity with animals.[6]  
 
Shigella 
Shigella is a very contagious bacteria, highly adapted to humans and some non-human 
primates; a small inoculum (10 to 200 organisms) is sufficient to cause infection. There are 
several species of Shigella, but the most concerning are those producing Shigatoxin, such as 
Shigella dysenteriae. Transmission occurs via faecal-oral route, and the pathogen may be 
present in contaminated foods or water. Post infection complications, such as arthritis, 
septicaemia, seizures or haemolytic uremic syndrome can occur.[6] 
Water safety threats (Category B) 
Vibrio cholerae 
Cholera is a major cause of epidemic diarrhoea throughout the developing world; it is caused by 
infection with toxigenic Vibrio cholerae serogroups O1 or O139. Large epidemics are often 
related to faecal contamination of water supplies or street vended foods. The disease is 
occasionally spread through eating raw or undercooked shellfish that might be naturally 
contaminated. There are no known animal hosts for Vibrio cholerae. Natural infection and 
currently available vaccines offer incomplete protection of relatively short duration and no 
multivalent vaccines are available for O139 infections. People with severe cholera can develop 
acute renal failure, severe electrolyte imbalances and coma. If untreated, severe dehydration 
can rapidly lead to shock and death in hours.[6] 
Cryptosporidium parvum 
There are many species of Cryptosporidium that infect animals, some of which also infect 
humans. While this parasite can be spread in several different ways, water (drinking water and 
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recreational water) is the most common way to spread the parasite. Cryptosporidium may also 
be found in soil, food, or surfaces that have been contaminated with faeces from infected 
humans or animals. Symptoms of cryptosporidiosis generally begin 2 to 10 days after becoming 
infected with the parasite, the most common being watery diarrhoea, which lasts for 1 or 2 
weeks.[6] 
Legionnaires’ disease 
The term given to severe pneumonia and systemic infection caused by Legionella sp. bacteria 
is Legionnaires' disease. Water is the major natural reservoir for Legionella, and the pathogen is 
found in many different natural and artificial aquatic environments such as cooling towers or 
water systems in buildings, including hospitals. Bacteria of the genus Legionella are recognised 
as a common cause of community-acquired pneumonia and a rare cause of hospital-acquired 
pneumonia.[11] Although there is antimicrobial treatment available, which allows for full recovery, 
the disease was included in this category due to the high consequences that a deliberate 
introduction of this bacteria in a water retention system can have. For example, in October to 
November 2014, a contaminated wet cooling system triggered the largest outbreak to date of 
Legionnaires’ disease in Portugal, among the largest ever reported in Europe.[48] According to 
experts, ‘the concordance between the independent analysis of meteorological conditions and 
temporal modelling supports the theory that the prevailing weather conditions created a unique 
setting for Legionella multiplication and may explain the large scale of the outbreak’.[48] 
However, modern disinfection through chlorination and the dilution of the agent in great 
amounts of waters should be enough to render it ineffective. Also, usually municipal water 
centres have security in place, which may deter potential perpetrators of deliberate 
introduction.[54]  
Alphaviruses (Category B) 
This category comprises Venezuelan (VEE), Western and Eastern Encephalitis viruses. VEE 
virus is more likely as a biowarfare candidate than other equine encephalitis viruses, because of 
its lower human infectious dose.[7] These are zoonotic mosquito-borne diseases, that affect 
horses, causing encephalitic disease on both human and equine species.[14] Aerosol 
transmission may also occur, and it is the ability of these viruses to remain highly infectious in 
aerosol state which particularly leads to their consideration as biological weapons. In addition, 
these alphaviruses can be produced in large quantity, in inexpensive and simplified systems 
and are relatively stable when stored or manipulated. In the 1960s, US military weaponized and 
stockpiled VEE virus to be used as an incapacitating agent; the stored viruses were later 
destroyed.[49] 
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Glanders (Category B) 
Glanders is a zoonotic disease of equids and other animals caused by Burkholderia mallei 
bacteria. It is transmissible via direct contact or through inhalation. During WWI, Germany used 
Glanders agent targeting horse, cattle and mules in locations as different as the US, Romania, 
Spain, Argentina and France. The results of the most of the attacks are unknown, although 
possibly successful.[60] 
Hantavirus (Category C) 
This zoonotic virus is carried asymptomatically by rodents, but causes severe haemorrhagic 
fever with renal syndrome in human hosts.[2, 14] Hantaviruses represent the most widely 
distributed rodent-borne zoonotic viruses, and are transmitted through inhalation of the virus 
from infected rodent faeces. Thus, certain occupational groups – such as farmers, sweepers 
and labourers who are likely to have high exposure to infected dust – and people living in rural 
areas are at higher risk of infection.[2] 
Nipah (Category C) 
Nipah virus was first recognized in 1999 during an outbreak among pig farmers in Malaysia. [2] It 
is a zoonotic disease agent, which affects pigs and other domestic animals, with less severe 
clinical signs, and causes severe encephalitis in humans.[14] Since its initial identification, there 
have been nipah outbreaks almost every year in Southern Asia, causing severe disease and 
death in people and thus making it an emerging disease of serious public health concern. The 
virus has caused severe disease outbreaks in pigs, resulting in significant economic losses for 
farmers in Malaysia, India and Bangladesh.[2, 40]  
 
Other agents and diseases  
Although the following agents and diseases are not part of CDC’s list, they deserve a special 
mention as they are relevant, concerning the purposes of this report. They were selected 
because they either have a high economic impact, since they disseminate quickly through 
livestock, or because they severely affect human populations. Also, they might lack control 
strategies applicable to them, such as vaccines and antimicrobials. Agents that have a long 
incubation period, that are preventable through easily achievable vaccination strategies, or that 
only cause mild zoonosis, were not included here. 
Rinderpest 
Rinderpest is an exclusively animal disease, caused by a virus which affects ruminants and 
swine.[14] The world was declared to be officially free from rinderpest infection at the 79th OIE 
General Session, in May 2011.[39] Historically, the disease occurred in Europe, Africa and Asia 
and had major epizootic potential. In fact, the OIE was created, in 1924, in order to assemble an 
appropriate response to the occurrence of a rinderpest epizootic in Europe, after the 
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introduction of infected zebu cattle, via the Belgian port of Antwerp.[29] Rinderpest virus stocks 
are still present at several facilities around the world. It is a OIE-FAO priority to destroy or 
relocate the all remaining vaccine and virus stocks to one of the 5 approved facilities1 until 2018. 
These laboratories follow strict regulations regarding biosafety and are subject to OIE re-
evaluation every 3 years.[17]  
Rift Valley Fever 
Rift Valley Fever is a mosquito-borne viral zoonotic disease of ruminants and other animals.[14] 
The virus also has the ability to infect humans; the vast majority of human infections result from 
direct or indirect contact with the blood or organs of infected animals, but can also be 
consequence of bites of infected mosquitoes.[59] It can also be transmitted as an aerosol – a 
number of laboratory workers has already been infected through this route. This virus was 
included by the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense (convened by the John Hopkins 
University) among those considered to be likely used as a biological weapon.[7] 
Vector-borne diseases  
This category comprises diseases transmitted by arthropod vectors such as Chikungunya, 
Dengue, Zika, Malaria and Leishmania. The WHO estimates that one-sixth of the illnesses and 
disabilities suffered worldwide are related to vector-borne diseases, with more than half of the 
world’s population being currently at risk.[59] The ongoing climate change affects positively the 
lifecycles of arthropod vectors, such as Aedes, Anopheles and Culex mosquitos, and 
Phlebotomine sand flies.[33] The burden of climate-sensitive diseases is greatest for the poorest 
populations. For example, the per capita mortality rate from vector-borne diseases is almost 300 
times greater in developing than in developed regions, where vector-borne diseases constitute 
an important cause of death, disease burden and health inequity, a brake on socioeconomic 
development, and a strain on health services.[4] A key challenge arises from the non-specificity 
and similarity of symptoms caused by many of mosquito-borne viruses, especially Zika virus, 
Dengue, and Chikungunya virus, that present acute fever similar to many diseases endemic in 
the tropics, such as Malaria.[25] A recent WHO report, summarizing the importance of vector-
borne diseases, states that previously relatively stable geographical distributions are now 
changing owing to a range of factors, ‘including climate change, intensive farming, dams, 
irrigation, deforestation, population movements, rapid unplanned urbanization, and phenomenal 
increases in international travel and trade’.[4, 59] 
Altogether, climate has an important influence on vector-borne disease transmission, and there 
is evidence that ongoing climate change is affecting and will continue to affect the distributions 
and burdens of these infections. The interactions are complex, and to move beyond broad 
                                                             
1 OIE has established two types of holding facilities. Type A can store any kind of Rinderpest containing material, 
except for vaccines, while type B is allowed to store vaccines and material for their production. 
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generalizations in order to build health policies, an assessment of individual diseases with 
respect to specific disease control decisions is required.[4] 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
The infection causes a wide spectrum of symptoms in birds but does not normally infect 
humans. However, certain strains have managed to cross the species barrier and infect people. 
Since humans have little or no immunity to such strains, they cause severe respiratory disease 
(e.g. pneumonia) or death. It has been learnt that the past three world pandemics have been 
due to influenza of avian origin. Today, avian influenza is entrenched in poultry in some 
countries, resulting in millions of affected and culled chickens, several hundred human cases, 
and many human deaths. Outbreaks in poultry have seriously impacted livelihoods, food 
security, the economy and international trade in affected countries.[2] 
Foot-and-mouth disease virus 
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of livestock with significant economic impact; it is not 
readily transmissible to humans. The disease affects cattle and swine as well as sheep, goats, 
and other cloven-hoofed ruminants. In a susceptible population, morbidity approaches 100%. 
Intensively reared animals are more susceptible to the disease than traditional breeds. FMD is 
the first disease among the OIE listed ones for which the OIE established an official status of 
freedom referring to countries and zones.[39]  
Classical and African Swine Fever 
These swine diseases are not related. Nevertheless, they share some common characteristics 
– they are absent from the majority of developed countries, their most virulent strains have 
100% morbidity and high mortality rates, and their occurrence represents a heavy burden for 
the swine production industry. While there is no vaccine for ASF, CSF can be prevented 
through vaccination protocols. However, most of “disease free” countries apply a “no 
vaccination” policy, and have control systems that provide emergency vaccination capacity. 
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4. Role of International Organisations and its mechanisms for 
coordinating efforts 
United Nations  
United Nations Organization has specific bodies assigned to deal with biological threats and 
disaster prevention and relief. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) 
works on the promotion of disarmament as a means to achieve global peace. It supports the 
implementation of BTWC through a specific unit and raises awareness to the importance of 
disarmament issues. The UNODA works at a very high level, creating opportunities for 
governments to reach diplomatic agreements, and also at the field in specific missions. Besides, 
the UN Secretary General Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons conducts field operations to ensure that BTWC dispositions are fulfilled. 
The BTWC is revised periodically and the 8th Review Conference will take place in Geneva, in 
August 2016.[32] 
UNISDR is the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. It promotes the coordination of efforts to 
ensure that natural disasters and deliberate attacks have the least possible consequences, 
through the improvement of preparedness, establishment of frameworks and avocation of 
cooperation between governments and organizations. Currently, the UNISDR is campaigning 
very actively in the application of Sendai Framework 2015 – 2030. This is a disaster risk 
reduction programme, which emerged from a voluntary agreement between nations, supported 
by the UNISDR. It is based on seven pillars, and its main goal is ‘The substantial reduction of 
disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, 
cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries’[52]. 
WHO  
The WHO is an organisation which falls under UN institutions. International Health Regulations 
(IHR), which entered into force on 15th June 2007, are WHO’s legal instrument for safeguarding 
public health - they require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health 
events to WHO.[35] Also, the OIE and FAO work closely with the WHO to improve the ability of 
National animal and public health systems to respond to current and emerging animal health 
risks with public health consequences.[9] Together, these organizations form a Tripartite Alliance 
which essentially addresses high priority transversal issues, such as rabies, zoonotic influenza 
and antimicrobial resistance. All the previously mentioned activities fall under the One Health 
framework. 
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FAO 
The FAO is the UN body responsible for the achievement of food security, eradication of hunger 
and malnutrition, and driving forward of economic and social progress, mainly in developing 
countries. FAO’s activities address many overlapping animal health issues, since animal 
products do not only represent a source of high-quality food, but are also a source of income for 
many small farmers and animal holders in developing countries. FAO supports countries’ 
capacity development to achieve their own goals in food security, nutrition and agricultural 
development. [16] 
OIE 
The OIE was created in 1924, before the United Nations, to assemble an appropriate response 
to the Rinderpest pandemics ravaging throughout Europe. The organisation plays an important 
role in minimising animal and public health risks attributable to zoonosis and other animal 
diseases, which can have severe consequences for global food safety and security. [9] Also, the 
OIE promotes animal welfare, while creating standards for safe trade of animals and their by-
products.[39]  
In 1995, the standards developed by the OIE were recognised by the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the WTO. SPS 
Agreement’s goal is to minimise the risk of importing pathogens and to remove unjustifiable 
sanitary restrictions to international trade. Hence, an importing country can only apply sanitary 
measures to imports if a similar level of protection is applied internally and to all imports. 
Member countries may introduce standards providing a higher level of protection than that 
provided by OIE standards if they have a scientific justification and had performed science-
based risk analysis.[53] The National Veterinary Services which implement OIE animal and 
welfare standards and other measures, are the first line of defence against zoonotic and other 
animal diseases, and must meet the core requirements for its diagnostic and control. The OIE 
provides assistance to its member countries through ‘PVS Pathway’ initiative, which shifts the 
emphasis from short-term, emergency-type approaches, to improving veterinary services 
towards a more sustainable, long term strengthening of capabilities and resources.[9] 
Regarding disaster risk reduction and preparedness, OIE summoned a roster of experts on the 
theme to assemble an ad hoc group, whose purpose was to a set of guidelines to be applied in 
disaster management. These guidelines provide a framework that veterinary professionals can 
use to develop processes and procedures for managing the veterinary sector’s actions to 
reduce the adverse consequences of disasters as they outline guiding principles and the roles 
that Veterinary Services play in reducing the impact of disasters in all phases of the Disaster 
Management Cycle.[39] 
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Funds, Programmes, Solidarity 
The UN System comprises several institutions devoted to promoting international financial 
stability and to supporting capacity building in developing countries, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. These institutions are financed by Member 
Countries and external donors. Besides, some countries have their own programmes oriented 
to disaster reduction and relief. Some of these programmes work well over borders to help 
struggling countries and to donate to specific UN bodies, such as UNDC, UNDP, FAO, etc.  
 
The OIE has its own solidarity fund - The OIE World Animal Health and Welfare Fund. It was 
created on 2004 by the OIE World Assembly of Delegates and has been established ’for the 
purpose of projects of international public utility relating to the control of animal diseases, 
including those affecting humans, and the promotion of animal welfare and animal production 
food safety’.[39]    
The OIE World Fund’s goals are: to improve governance of animal health systems, to 
modernise existing national veterinary legislation, to develop veterinary education and to 
develop tools which empower Members to deal with urgent situations regarding the prevention 
and control of animal diseases (e.g. vaccine banks, communication programs). Also, it aims to 
improve the animal health scientific community worldwide through laboratory twinning projects, 
twinning projects on veterinary education, and twinning projects between veterinary statutory 
bodies. Lastly, it offers the PVS Evaluation Missions to improve compliance of Member 
Countries with OIE standards. [39]   
 
Global Health Security Agenda 
GHSA is a programme, launched in February 2014, endorsed by 50 nations and several 
organizations. It acknowledges the essential need for a multilateral and multi-sectoral approach 
to strengthen both the global capacity and nations' capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious diseases threats whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental. GHSA is 
facilitating collaborative, capacity-building efforts to achieve specific and measurable targets in 
biological threat reduction area, while accelerating achievement of the core capacities required 
by the WHO’s IHR, the OIE’s Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway, and other relevant 
global health security frameworks. It is comprised of Action Packages, subscribed by countries, 
which are sets of goals related to a pressing issue, to be achieved in a 5 year timeframe. Also, it 
offers an Assessment Tool, to measure countries’ status and progress in building capacity. This 
partnership is led and supported by a GHSA Steering Group composed of 10 member nations. 
In addition to individual countries, advisory partners include the WHO, the FAO and the OIE, 
Interpol, the Economic Community of West African States, the UNISDR, and the European 
Union.  
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Surveillance, Monitoring and Early Response 
Animals play an important role as biosensors for accidental or deliberate releases of infectious 
agents and toxins, and for emerging diseases. The same disease surveillance and intelligence 
systems that are in place to detect day-to-day occurrences of natural outbreaks in animals 
within countries and at national borders, will also detect deliberate and accidental releases.[36] 
The OIE Animal Health and Information System gathers daily data from around the world. The 
information is predestined at decision makers and other stakeholders, to enable them to take 
the necessary preventive measures. Under this system, the occurrence of a disease must be 
reported as soon as possible (within 24 hours) to the OIE Headquarters, which then redirects 
the information through appropriate channels.[53] The response to disease is the same whether it 
is directed against natural infection and deliberate or accidental release. In the case of zoonotic 
diseases, coordination of the animal health and public health response is essential, and control 
is often more successful if focused on eliminating or controlling the pathogen at the animal 
source.[36]   
Warning systems provide a worldwide surveillance network for the early detection and rapid 
reporting of any suspicious disease occurrence that is natural or could have its origin in an act 
of bio/agroterrorism. Currently, the ‘Global Early Warning System for major disease including 
zoonosis’ (GLEWS) is one of the mechanisms used together by the OIE, FAO, and WHO for 
monitoring health data from existing event-based surveillance systems and to track and verify 
relevant animal and zoonotic events.[15] However, GLEWS is not the only existing system for 
input of diseases epidemiological knowledge. Some other unofficial platforms, such as ‘ProMed’ 
(by the International Society for Infectious Diseases) and ‘Epicore’ (a newer tool by the same 
institution) use networks of professionals spread all over the world to communicate disease 
occurrence suspicions and to do rumour tracking. The early detection of high-risk diseases is, in 
most of the cases, done by suspicious field clinicians. That type of surveillance should be 
encouraged through regular educational sessions aimed at field players. The sensitiveness of 
surveillance networks may be greatly increased through analysis and modelling efforts, in order 
to guide and concentrate the surveillance activities.[13] 
When there is suspicion of malicious release, collaboration with law enforcement agencies 
becomes an important part of the response. Recent events (e.g. Ebola outbreaks in West 
Africa) have shown that in the absence of strong well governed health systems, infectious 
disease can rapidly spread and get out of control with devastating consequences and 
heightened risk for the whole world. It is much smarter and more economically viable to provide 
sustainable funding for animal and public health services than to deal with a large outbreak 
which has got out of hand because a national detection and response was insufficient. [36] 
26 
 
Unfortunately, pockets of civil instability continue to emerge in different parts of the world. This 
may exacerbate the risk of infectious disease threats since civil instability often leads to health 
systems falling apart. Infectious disease may also lead to instability because it may damage 
micro and macro economies or it may lead to reduction in food supply, both of which can 
motivate people to take unprecedented and unpredictable actions.[36] 
In order to respond promptly to crisis situations, the FAO and OIE launched jointly in 2006 the 
‘Crisis Management Centre – Animal Health’. It works closely with the GLEWS and the 
‘Emergency Prevention System’ to continuously track and analyse the animal disease situation 
worldwide missions to countries to help assess epidemiologic situations, diagnose outbreaks of 
animal diseases, and set up immediate measures to prevent or stop disease spread.[35]  
On what concerns human health, WHO has developed a comprehensive ‘event management 
system’ to verify critical information about outbreaks and ensure accurate and timely 
communications between key international public health professionals, including WHO Regional 
Offices, National Services, collaborating centres and partners in the Global Outbreak Alert and 
Response Network.[59] 
Laboratory safety 
Expert investigations carried out by health authorities are needed  to establish the cause of a 
disease outbreak and veterinary laboratories are often the first to discover its source.[36] A 
veterinary laboratory is held accountable for a range of issues apart from the delivery of basic 
diagnostic services. These may include health and safety, biosecurity, animal welfare and 
ethics, environmental contamination, genetic manipulations and quality assurance. In addition to 
general health and safety issues, veterinary laboratories have the responsibility of containing 
pathogens and preventing their accidental release. Laboratory biological risk management 
practices should specifically recognise the potential for bioterrorist threats including the concept 
of the insider threat (e.g. the bioterrorist threat posed by a staff member).[38] 
Veterinary laboratories and other animal related facilities routinely handle biological materials 
that may constitute or contain infectious agents and toxins, which may cause adverse animal or 
public health and economic effects, due to uncontrolled release inside or outside the laboratory.  
Laboratory and animal facilities managers are responsible for providing a management system 
that ensures safe and secure handling, storage, and transport of these biological materials (a 
biological risk management system).[38] The laboratory is expected to perform a risk analysis 
process, as shown in Flowchart 1 (Annexes). 
Laboratory facilities are categorized as basic – Biosafety Level (BSL) 1; basic – BSL 2; 
containment – BSL 3; and maximum containment – BSL 4. BSL designations are based on a 
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combination of the design features, construction, containment facilities, equipment, practices 
and operational procedures required for working with agents from the various risk groups. It is 
available in Annexes section a table (Table 1) where laboratories and agents characteristics 
regarding BSL classification are described in further detail. There is a correspondence, although 
not direct, between agents’ CDC risk group (A, B and C) and the required BSL of laboratories 
working with them. Thus, the assignment of a BSL takes into consideration the pathogenic 
agent, the facilities available, and the equipment practices and procedures required to conduct 
work safely in the laboratory.[57] 
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5. Reality check 
Concerning issues 
Globalisation has made it far more difficult to keep animal diseases from spreading, and almost 
impossible to keep highly infectious diseases controlled.[1] Opposed to what happened with 
previous pandemics, such as bubonic plague or Spanish flu, which took months to spread, 
recent events like SARS and avian flu indicate that today’s pathogens either are more easily 
spread or have more opportunities to do so. Currently, we are witnesses of the coexistence of 
intensive farming methods, including the centralization of animal markets and high-density 
livestock rearing, with traditional agriculture. This reality may provide the ideal opportunity for 
the emergence of new pathogens and their quick spread through animal and human 
populations. 
However, many developed nations have not experienced a major human or animal disease 
outbreak in over half a century – meaning that their people and governments are unused to 
coping politically and socially with large-scale infectious disease, whether it may be natural or 
intentionally caused.[1]  
Since the beginning of the XXI century, a variety of extremist groups has shown interest in using 
biological weapons. Although, so far, most of their attempts have ended in failure, the 2001 
‘anthrax letters’ episode, in the US, exemplifies how it is certainly conceivable that these actors 
might attain biological weapons offensives. Also, it is expected that they might employ or target 
animals as part of their implementation of a terrorist attack, due to the economic consequences 
that such action might bring.[1] 
Additionally, rapid developments in synthetic biology and the advent of microbiological kits may 
improve capabilities of both state and non-state actors, regarding biological warfare. No terrorist 
has ever synthesised a pathogen from scratch, but this does not mean it will never happen.[1] 
There is a general concern that synthetic biology will lead to further simplification of laboratory 
work protocols and that, combined with open access to the genomic DNA sequences of 
pathogenic organisms, and the reduction of price for DNA synthesis, will make biology 
increasingly accessible to people operation outside well-equipped professional research 
laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions.[23] Human threats are even more 
dynamic than evolutionary factors, in that human beings can adapt their behaviour 
instantaneously, can strategize to avoid defences and can concentrate their efforts on 
vulnerabilities.[1] Nowadays, synthetic biology has been subject to a common narrative, 
supported by public health officers and government actors, regarding the biosecurity threat it 
poses. This framing may lead to some misconceptions, mainly from a public opinion 
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perspective. It is believed that, besides simplifying biology and making it accessible for common 
people without special facilities, the growth of Do-It-Yourself biology may offer dual-use 
knowledge. Also, the decrease in price of DNA synthesis would make it easier to create new 
pathogens, which could be used as biological weapons for high consequence, mass casualty 
attacks.[23]  
Myth busters 
Experts on biological threats studies, such as Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Katherine 
Vogel, defend that the previously mentioned views overestimate the real bioterrorist threat. [23, 43] 
Due to their technical complexity and high developmental costs, as well as their reliance on 
living microorganisms that are highly sensitive to their environmental and handling conditions, 
the attempted use of biological agents is unpredictable in its outcomes. As shown by past 
governmental programs and independent terrorist plans — the failures in the developmental 
process cause extensive delays in program advancement. Furthermore, the stages of a 
bioweapon lifecycle — research, development, production, scale-up, weaponization, and testing 
— are highly interdependent, and the successful passage from one stage to the next requires 
organizational and managerial conditions that promote coordination, cooperation, and 
information exchange among the various teams of experts involved, which are particularly 
difficult to achieve. As a result, most past state and non-state bioweapons programs have been 
unsuccessful at reaching their goals.[23, 43] 
Perhaps, the most important point in the analysis of the possible development of synthetic 
biological agents is the consideration of how ‘tacit knowledge’ is implied in the process. Broadly, 
tacit knowledge refers to skills and techniques that cannot be readily codified but, rather, 
acquired by a process of ‘learning by doing’ or ‘learning by example’ and often take considerate 
time and effort to gain.[23] Training by experienced professional researchers and specialist skills 
acquired by trial and error, as well as the enculturation in laboratory practices, are still highly 
relevant to the success of synthetic biology projects.[23] 
On what concerns DNA synthesis, the public opinion disquietude about online orders of DNA 
sequences by common individuals – the de novo synthesis of poliovirus in 2002 and the 
“reconstruction” of Spanish flu virus in 2005 – specialists’ opinion is reassuring. Firstly, it is 
important to differentiate the synthesis of oligonucleotides (less than 100 nucleotides is length), 
from “gene synthesis” (de novo synthesis of “gene-length” DNA sequences, typically 200 to 
3000 base pairs), and from the assembly of de novo synthetized gene-length fragments into 
genetic circuits and whole genomes. Obtaining the oligonucleotides is only the first step in a 
complicated process – even specialized DNA synthesis companies cannot synthetize de novo 
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any desired DNA sequence. DNA synthesis is error prone and some sequences are recalcitrant 
to chemical synthesis. [23] 
So, we are still better at reading DNA than actually writing it. In fact, the real challenge 
regarding the creation or virulence and transmissibility enhancement of biological agents is not 
their DNA synthesis, but rather  the assembly of DNA fragments.[23] It is a painstakingly difficult 
process that requires expertise, adequate laboratory materials and a seemingly infinite 
succession of trial and error experiments, in order to build a functional genome, instead of 
constructing a genome-sized DNA fragment. Besides, although this cannot be taken as a 
definitive rule, as viruses suffer passages though host organisms during their production 
process in the laboratory, they tend to accumulate mutations that generate an attenuated strain. 
Similarly, bacteria cultured in laboratories tend to lose virulence.[23] 
Given these points, it is clear that public opinion and some governmental statements overlook 
significant difficulties faced with the process of designing or producing a pathogen, as they 
focus mainly on material features. Thus, missing important socio-technical factors, such as tacit 
knowledge and DNA synthesis and assembly specificities that go beyond currently automated 
processes, might be a gullible perspective.[23] 
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6. Conclusions 
Writing this report was a great opportunity to extend my knowledge to an unlikely field relating to 
Veterinary Medicine. While doing my research, I found myself rephrasing the report’s title 
several times, as my perception on the subject changed, and so changed the focus I wanted it 
to have. 
All things considered, the threats which humans, animals and the environment face, regarding 
biological agents are broad on their nature, on their sources, and on their likely impact and 
duration. The bioterrorist threat definitely exists, although it may not be as easily achievable as 
one might think, due to the technical constraints related to creating ‘weapons’ and not only 
‘pathogens’. In fact, this type of threat ends up taking a bigger toll on one’s psyche than on 
concrete matters, due to the unpredictability associated with isolated individuals or with small 
extremist groups, rather than populations – which have foreseeable behaviour patterns. 
Moreover, the threat posed by laboratories and investigation centres must be carefully weighed 
in. Despite the application of strict biosafety rules, accidents have happened more than a few 
times. Although this may seem unavoidable or poorly relevant regarding the amount of existing 
facilities, that is not the case. One release or accidental escape of a highly virulent pathogen, for 
which quick response systems are not prepared, may represent the trigger of a pandemic.  
Additionally, the deliberate or accidental introduction of new species of animals and plants can 
disrupt entire ecosystems. Previous deliberate introductions have resulted in sanitary chaos, 
due to the lack of foresight regarding their evolution in the new environment. Also, accidental 
introductions tend to occur more frequently, due to increased international trade and increased 
transportation of people around the globe. 
In the final analysis, the importance of efficient surveillance methods and quick response 
strategies cannot be overstated. It may seem more relevant to be prepared for specific threats, 
for their consequences are already well known among us. However, the biggest turning points 
in history have been unexpected events. Thus, it makes sense to be prepared to the 
unexpected, through generalist surveillance systems and simulation exercises which involve 
stakeholders from different fields of knowledge, able to perform diverse response types, besides 
the traditional contingency plans aimed at specific disease events. 
 
“This idea that in order to make a decision you need to focus on the consequences (which you can know) 
rather than the probability (which you can’t know) is the central idea of uncertainty.” 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable 
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Annexes  
Biological Risk Analysis Process 
 
 
  
Flowchart 1 - Biological Risk Analysis Process. Source – OIE, 2015, Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for 
Terrestrial Animals 
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Laboratory Biosafety Levels 
BSL Agents Practices Primary Barriers and Safety 
Equipment 
Facilities 
(Secondary 
Barriers) 
1 Not known to consistently 
cause diseases in healthy 
adults 
Standard 
microbiological 
practices 
No primary barriers required. 
PPE: laboratory coats and 
gloves; eye and  face 
protection, as needed 
Laboratory bench and 
sink required 
2 Agents associated with 
human disease. 
Routes of transmission 
include percutaneous 
injury, ingestion and 
mucous membrane 
exposure. 
BSL-1 practice plus 
limited access, 
biohazard  warning 
signs, ‘Sharps’ 
precautions, 
Biosafety manual 
defining any needed 
waste 
decontamination or 
medical surveillance 
policies 
Primary barriers: BSCs or 
other physical containment ; 
devices used for all 
manipulations of agents that 
cause splashes or aerosols of 
infectious materials 
PPE: Laboratory coats, 
gloves, face and eye 
protection, as needed 
BSL-1 plus autoclave 
available 
3 Indigenous or exotic 
agents that may cause 
serious or potentially lethal 
disease through the 
inhalation route of 
exposure. 
BSL-2 practice plus 
controlled access, 
decontamination of 
all waste, 
decontamination of 
laboratory clothing 
before laundering  
Primary barriers: BSCs or 
other physical containment 
devices used for all open 
manipulations of agents 
PPE: Protective laboratory 
clothing, gloves, face, eye and 
respiratory protection, as 
needed 
BSL-2 plus physical 
separation from 
access,  self-closing, 
double-door access, 
exhausted air not 
recirculated, negative 
airflow, entry through 
airlock or anteroom, 
hand washing sink 
near laboratory exit 
4 Dangerous/exotic agents 
which pose high individual 
risk of aerosol-transmitted 
laboratory infections that 
are frequently fatal, for 
which there are no 
vaccines or treatments 
 
BSL-3 practices 
plus clothing 
change before 
entering, shower 
upon  exit 
All material 
decontaminated on 
exit from the facility. 
Primary barriers: 
All procedures conducted in  
Class III BSCs or Class I or II 
BSCs in combination with full-
body, air-supplied, positive 
pressure suit. 
BSL-3 plus separate 
building or isolated 
zone, dedicated supply 
and exhaust, vacuum, 
and decontamination 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Summary of Recommended Biosafety Levels for Infectious Agents 
Source: CDC: Section IV—Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria. In: Biosafety in Microbiological and 
Biomedical Laboratories. edn.; 2009. 
[5]
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Internship projects 
Technical disease cards updated 
 
Disease Last updated in 
African Horse sickness 2013 
African swine fever 2013 
Bluetongue 2013 
Bovine babesiosis 2013 
Classical swine fever 2009 
Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 2009 
Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia 2009 
Dourine 2013 
Epizootic haemorrhagic disease 2009 
Equine piroplasmosis 2009 
Foot and mouth disease 2013 
Glanders 2013 
Haemorrhagic septicaemia 2013 
Heartwater 2009 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza 2009 
Japanese encephalitis 2013 
Lumpy skin disease 2013 
Malignant catarrhal fever 2013 
Newcastle disease 2013 
Nipah (virus encephalitis) 2009 
Peste des petits ruminants (TDC + DIS) 2013 
Rabbit haemorrhagic disease 2015 
Rabies 2014 
Rift Valley fever 2009 
Rinderpest (TDC + DIS) 2013 
Screwworm 2013 
Sheep pox and goat pox 2013 
Swine influenza 2009 
Swine vesicular disease 2013 
Theileriosis 2009 
Trypanosoma evansi infections (including SURRA) 2013 
Trypanosomosis (tsetse-transmitted) 2013 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis 2013 
Vesicular stomatitis 2013 
MERS-CoV Factsheet 2014 
http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/technical-disease-cards/ 
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“Biothreat Watch” newsletter 
Biothreat Watch, Issue 1, Jan – May 2016 
General 
 Insights into the preparation of BWC review Jan/Feb 2016 
http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/206_0102/News/BWC-Parties-Prepare-for-Review-Meeting  
 New Developments in Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures; Ronald J. Kendall, 
Steven M. Presley, Seshadri S. Ramkumar, CRC Press,  Feb. 2016 - 185 pages 
https://books.google.fr/books?id=l3SmCwAAQBAJ&hl=fr&source=gbs_navlinks_s 
 Preparing for non-traditional biothreats Feb 2016 
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2015.0045  
 Contextual Factors Among Indiscriminate or Large Attacks on Food or Water Supplies, 1946-
2015 Feb 2016 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2015.0056  
 From over 90 000 cases to zero in two decades: the European Region is malaria free Apr 2016 
http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-releases/2016/04/from-over-90-
000-cases-to-zero-in-two-decades-the-european-region-is-malaria-free  
 The Department of Homeland Security Will Test Bioterror Airflow in New York Subway System 
May 2016  http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/05/dhs-will-test-bioterror-airflow-in-nyc-
subway.html#  
Diagnostic methods 
 Expansion of Microbial Forensics. Schmedes SE, et al. J Clin Microbiol. Feb 2016. Unofficial 
online version) 
https://www.researchgate.net/search.Search.html?type=publication&query=Expansion%20of%
20Microbial%20Forensics&tabViewId=57309dfded99e1394a514117&previous=researcher 
 Are public health microbiology laboratories in the European Union prepared for tracking 
infectious diseases? The first EULabCap report published, Feb 2016 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/press/news/_layouts/forms/News_DispForm.aspx?ID=1359&List=8db
7286c-fe2d-476c-9133-
18ff4cb1b568&Source=http%3A%2F%2Fecdc.europa.eu%2Fen%2Fhealthtopics%2Fmicrobiology
%2Fmicrobiology-activities%2Flaboratory-capability%2FPages%2Fdefault.aspx  
 Dong, M., et al. (Mar 2016), Standardized methods to generate mock (spiked) clinical 
specimens by spiking blood or plasma with cultured pathogens. J Appl Microbiol, 120: 1119–
1129. doi:10.1111/jam.13082 (The development of diagnostic platforms for detection of low prevalence 
pathogens such as biothreat or emerging agents is challenged by the lack of clinical specimens for performance 
evaluation. This deficit can be overcome using mock clinical specimens made by spiking cultured pathogens into 
human matrices.) 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jam.13082/abstract?systemMessage=Wiley+Online
+Library+will+be+unavailable+on+Saturday+14th+May+11%3A00-
14%3A00+BST+%2F+06%3A00-09%3A00+EDT+%2F+18%3A00-
21%3A00+SGT+for+essential+maintenance.Apologies+for+the+inconvenience.  
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 Mass spectrometry for the detection of bioterrorism agents: from environmental to clinical 
applications. Duriez E, et al. Mar 2016  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26956386 
(Restricted access) 
 First Commercial Zika Virus Test Gets FDA Approval, May 2016 
http://globalbiodefense.com/2016/05/02/first-commercial-zika-virus-test-gets-fda-approval/  
 
Emerging Diseases/ Emerging threats 
 Kenyan Police 'Foiled' Anthrax Attack Linked to IS Group, May 2016 
http://www.voanews.com/content/kenyan-police-foiled-anthrax-attack-linked-to-is-
group/3315042.html  
 European Union SHIPSAN ACT Joint Action publishes interim guidance on maritime transport 
and Zika virus disease http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21453  
 Zika virus: 2.2 billion people in 'at risk' areas http://www.bbc.com/news/health-36090650  
 Edmonds, J et al. “Multigeneration Cross-Contamination of Mail with Bacillus Anthracis 
Spores.” Ed. Raymond Schuch. PLoS ONE 11.4 (2016): e0152225. PMC. Web. 9 May 2016. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4849716/  
 Zeitlin, Larry et al. “Monoclonal Antibody Therapy for Junin Virus Infection.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113.16 (2016): 4458–4463. PMC. 
Web. 9 May 2016. (Argentinian Haemorrhagic Fever) 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4843420/?report=classic  
Vaccines 
 Eurosurveillance, Volume 21, Issue 6, 11 February 2016 - News  
European Commission Horizon 2020 programme call for vaccine development research into 
malaria and neglected infectious diseases, including Zika virus 
http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21376  
 Infographic about  Zika vaccine development process March 2016 
http://blog.dicksondata.com/2016/03/vaccinating-a-pandemic-the-hurdles-ahead-for-the-zika-
virus/  
 Zika vaccine efficacy trials could start in 2017, May 2016 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/zika-vaccine-efficacy-trials-could-start-2017  
 Defending against smallpox: a focus on vaccines, Emily A. Voigt et al. (Restricted Access) 
Expert Review of Vaccines  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14760584.2016.1175305?journalCode=ierv20 
 Pakistan polio: Seven killed in anti-vaccination attack April 2016  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36090891  
 Particulate delivery systems for vaccination against bioterrorism agents and emerging 
infectious pathogens. Fan, Y. and Moon, J. J. (April 2016), WIREs Nanomed Nanobiotechnol 
(Preview available) 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wnan.1403/abstract?systemMessage=Wiley+Online
+Library+will+be+unavailable+on+Saturday+14th+May+11%3A00-
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14%3A00+BST+%2F+06%3A00-09%3A00+EDT+%2F+18%3A00-
21%3A00+SGT+for+essential+maintenance.Apologies+for+the+inconvenience.  
 
Events 
 14th Annual CDC International Symposium on Biosafety, Jan 30 – Feb 3, 2016, Atlanta, USA. 
“Biosafety Management: Planning for the Future by Learning from the Past” was this year’s 
theme. http://globalbiodefense.com/event/cdc-international-symposium-on-biosafety-2016/  
 The American Society of Microbiology Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases 2016 
Research Meeting Feb 8-10, 2016 in Arlington, Virginia, USA. http://www.asmbiodefense.org/   
 15th Medical Biodefense Conference Apr 26-29, 2016, Munich, Germany. It focused on medical 
aspects of biodefense, presenting the latest research findings and products in the areas of 
diagnostics, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by highly dangerous infectious agents.  
http://www.biodefense2016.org/#sthash.UbR5VOWj.dpuf 
 14th Annual Vaccines + Therapeutics Conference 2016 – “Biodefense, AMR, Emerging 
Infectious Diseases”, May 17-19, Washington DC, USA 
http://www.infocastinc.com/downloads_pdf/vaccines-therapeutics-2016-summit-agenda.pdf   
 NCT CBRNe USA 2016, May 31st – June 2nd http://cbrneusa.com/program/  
 World Conference on Disaster Management , June 7-8, 2016 in Toronto, Canada. 
http://www.wcdm.org/programs.html  
 The 12th International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Agents, CBW Symposium 2016, will be held June 8-10, 2016 in Stockholm, Sweden. 
http://www.foi.se/en/Our-Services/Conferences-and-Seminars/12th-CBW-Protection-
Symposium/  
 Preventing & Treating Biological Exposures – An Occupational Health Colloquium on June 13-
15, 2016 in Austin, Texas.  Hosted by the Eagleson Institute, in partnership with the Elizabeth R. 
Griffin Research Foundation http://www.eagleson.org/conferences/occupational-health-
colloquium  
 2nd Biodefense World Summit, June 27 – 30, Baltimore, USA 
http://www.biodefenseworldsummit.com/ 
Collaborating Centres Activities 
 Overview of the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory Lowenthal, John (Restricted 
access) Journal of Infection and Public Health , Volume 0 , Issue 0 
http://www.jiph.org/article/S1876-0341%2816%2930024-7/abstract  
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OIE Bulletin article 
IVSA Animal Welfare Conference 
Utrecht, The Netherlands, 22-24 April 2016 
The International Veterinary Students Association (IVSA) is a non-profit organization of veterinary 
students, representing approximately 30,000 students in more than 60 countries. Among its core 
objectives are raising the overall standards of veterinary education, supporting measures to improve the 
standard of animal welfare worldwide and encouraging cooperation between members, veterinary 
student associations and international organizations. In 27th May 2014, IVSA and the OIE signed a 
cooperation agreement. This document promotes the collaboration of the parties in common interest 
areas, such as veterinary education, animal welfare and in the scope of IVSA Standing Committee on 
One Health. Also, both parties agreed to invite the other to conferences and consultancies in which 
common interests would be addressed.  
With the support of the OIE, IVSA organized its first Animal Welfare Conference. This 3 day event was 
aimed at students from all over the world who have a special interest in this area. It represented an 
opportunity to learn about the current projects and research on this field, as well as to understand the 
role several organizations play in the welfare of animals and improving animal housing and 
transportation conditions, as well as raising the standards of animal welfare. Also, the conference 
allowed students to interact with representatives from international organizations, veterinary and other 
federations and associations, academia, policy makers and colleagues in general. 
The event was attended by around 150 students and recently graduated veterinarians, representing the 
five continents, and had the participation of 22 speakers. The OIE was represented by Dr Alex 
Thiermann (former President of the OIE Code Commission), who gave a lecture on the implementation 
of OIE welfare standards worldwide. Dr Thiermann talked about the pioneer role of the OIE in the 
organization of Global Animal Welfare Conferences, the evolution of the subjects addressed in each 
conference and the inclusion of aquatic animal welfare. Also, the roles of each Scientific Commission 
were explained, with special attention to Aquatic Animal Health Standards Comission, and the broad 
spectrum of topics it comprises. In addition Dr Sirah Abdul Rahman, also represented the OIE and 
provided a point of view with respect to animal welfare and religious practices.  
Participants found the event to be a success, especially regarding the presentations given by speakers 
from backgrounds other that veterinarian. The conference allowed to meet other cultures perspectives 
and realities on animal welfare and opened doors for future cooperation. 
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Other projects  
 
Not yet online 
 PPR portal  
 Rinderpest portal 
 Biothreat reduction strategy portal 
Confidential 
 Laboratory twinning database 
 Biothreat reduction conference – related research 
 
